What the Hormuz Numbers Can and Cannot Tell You
EIA Global Energy Security Data, released August 12, 2026 · Updated August 14, 2026
EIA's newest data show reported oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz falling from 21.6 million barrels per day in late 2025 to 4.9 million in the second quarter of 2026, a 77% decline. That figure is circulating as a measure of oil supply. It is not one. In the same table, world oil supply fell about 4%, and EIA's own methodology note says the tracking data behind the Hormuz figure have been “especially unreliable” since late February 2026. The number is real and worth attention. What it measures is what tanker tracking can see, and in 2026 that is not the same thing as oil.
What EIA published
On August 12, 2026, EIA released its monthly Global Energy Security Data, a supplement to the Short-Term Energy Outlook that tracks oil moving through the world's maritime chokepoints. Crude oil and petroleum liquids, million barrels per day:
| Chokepoint | 1Q25 | 2Q25 | 3Q25 | 4Q25 | 1Q26 | 2Q26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strait of Malacca | 22.3 | 23.8 | 23.4 | 24.9 | 21.3 | 16.6 |
| Strait of Hormuz | 20.9 | 21.0 | 21.3 | 21.6 | 14.9 | 4.9 |
| Suez Canal and SUMED | 4.6 | 5.1 | 5.6 | 5.9 | 5.7 | 5.8 |
| Bab el-Mandeb | 3.9 | 4.5 | 4.6 | 5.4 | 5.6 | 8.1 |
| Danish Straits | 5.0 | 4.8 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 4.9 | 4.7 |
| Turkish Straits | 3.8 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.3 | 4.1 |
| Panama Canal | 2.8 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 3.2 |
| Cape of Good Hope | 9.0 | 9.3 | 9.0 | 9.9 | 8.2 | 9.4 |
| World total oil supply | 105.0 | 107.7 | 108.2 | 103.9 | 96.1 | 99.7 |
EIA, Global Energy Security Data, August 12, 2026, Table 2, from Vortexa tanker tracking and EIA analysis. The 2026 quarters for Hormuz, Malacca and Bab el-Mandeb are the ones EIA flags as affected by unreliable ship-signal data; see below.
Reported oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz, million barrels per day
The collapse is not confined to one cargo type. EIA's breakout for Hormuz shows crude and condensate falling from 15.9 to 3.7 million b/d between 4Q25 and 2Q26, petroleum products from 5.7 to 1.1, and liquefied natural gas from 10.5 to 0.8 billion cubic feet per day.
Why these cannot all be counts of barrels
Three checks, each against published data.
1. World supply did not lose 16.7 million barrels a day. The reported Hormuz decline from 4Q25 to 2Q26 is 16.7 million b/d. World total oil supply in the same table fell 4.2 million b/d over the same two quarters, and had recovered to 99.7 by 2Q26. If 16.7 million barrels a day had stopped moving, the supply line would show it. It does not.
2. The barrels could not have gone around. Only three pipelines can move Gulf oil to the sea without transiting Hormuz: Saudi Arabia's East-West line (5 million b/d nameplate, briefly expanded to 7 in 2019), the UAE's line to Fujairah (1.8 million b/d), and Iran's Goreh-Jask line (about 0.3 million b/d, lightly used). In June 2025, EIA estimated that about 2.6 million b/d of unused capacity on the Saudi and UAE lines could bypass the strait in a disruption. Rerouting 16.7 million b/d through 2.6 million b/d of spare pipeline is not arithmetic that works.
3. Nothing that large has ever happened. The largest one-year decline in world oil production in the Energy Institute's 60-year record was 6.2 million b/d, in 2020, when a pandemic shut much of the world economy. The Hormuz table implies a loss more than two and a half times that size, concentrated in one waterway, in six months, while world supply fell 4.
A number can be produced by a real event, a broken measurement, or both at once. The checks above rule out only one reading: that 16.7 million barrels a day of oil stopped flowing. They do not rule out a real disruption of some smaller size, and the price record below is evidence that something real happened. The point is narrower. The published transit figure has stopped being a count of barrels, and the agency that publishes it says so.
How the numbers are made
Chokepoint transit volumes are not metered. They are estimated from Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals, position broadcasts that ships transmit and firms like Vortexa aggregate. Ships can switch AIS off or manipulate it, to evade sanctions or for security when transiting hazardous water. EIA already supplements the Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and Malacca figures with port origin-and-destination analysis for exactly this reason. Its August release carries this note:
“Since the end of February 2026, AIS signal data for ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz have become especially unreliable. For 2026 Hormuz volumes, tanker tracking data are being revised frequently based on the best available information.”
EIA, Global Energy Security Data, August 2026, methodology notes.
The instrument degraded at the end of February 2026, and the agency operating it says so in print. Reported Malacca volumes fell in the same two quarters, which is consistent: much of the Gulf crude bound for Asia transits both straits, so cargo that tracking loses at Hormuz is also lost at Malacca. Suez, the Danish Straits and the Turkish Straits, which carry little Gulf-origin oil, barely moved.
What the price record shows
Prices are measured at the point of sale, not inferred from ship signals, and they say something real happened in the same window.
WTI crude oil, monthly average, dollars per barrel
WTI averaged $64.51 in February 2026, $91.38 in March, and $102.13 in May, a rise of 58% in three months, before easing to $80.46 in July, still well above any month of 2025. A price move of that size and timing is evidence of a real disruption to supply or to the expectation of supply. How large a disruption, the transit data can no longer say. We do not assign the price move a cause here; readers can place a price spike and a measurement failure that began in the same month side by side without our help.
Also in the table: the routes that moved
Two reported series rose while Hormuz fell. Bab el-Mandeb, the strait at the mouth of the Red Sea, went from 5.4 million b/d in 4Q25 to 8.1 in 2Q26, up 50%. The Cape of Good Hope, the long way around Africa, went from 8.2 in 1Q26 to 9.4 in 2Q26. Reported routings visibly shifted even as the totals became less reliable. We note the shift without interpreting it further, since these two series rest on the same tracking data.
How to read the next release
The next Short-Term Energy Outlook is scheduled for September 9, 2026. Three things are worth checking before quoting any Hormuz number from it:
- The world supply line. A real loss of oil appears there. A tracking failure does not.
- Revisions to prior quarters. EIA says the 2026 Hormuz figures are being revised frequently. Expect 1Q26 and 2Q26 to change, possibly by a lot.
- The methodology note. The sentence about AIS reliability is the single most informative line in the release. If it softens or disappears, the numbers mean more. While it stands, they mean less.
The rule this piece leaves you with: a chokepoint transit number is a measurement of what tracking systems can see. In 2026, that is not the same thing as a measurement of oil.
Sources
- EIA, Global Energy Security Data, August 12, 2026 supplement to the Short-Term Energy Outlook: all chokepoint transit volumes and the quoted methodology notes.
- EIA, Today in Energy, June 16, 2025: Hormuz bypass pipelines and the 2.6 million b/d unused-capacity estimate.
- EIA spot price series: monthly WTI averages.
- Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy: world oil production, 1965–2025, for the largest-decline comparison.
- See also: Why are gas prices high right now?